Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization

Authors

Saptarshi Mukherjee, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi
Nozomu Muto, Yokohama National University
Eve Ramaekers, Université Catholique de Louvain
Arunava Sen, Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi Centre)

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Journal of Economic Theory

Abstract

We show that the Pareto correspondence can be implemented in weakly undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. This resolves a question raised in Börgers (1991). The result is also extended to show that all social choice correspondences satisfying tops-inclusivity and a requirement called the seconds-property can be implemented.

First Page

229

Last Page

243

DOI

10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.010

Publication Date

3-1-2019

Recommended Citation

Mukherjee, Saptarshi; Muto, Nozomu; Ramaekers, Eve; and Sen, Arunava, "Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization" (2019). Journal Articles. 935.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/935