Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization
Article Type
Research Article
Publication Title
Journal of Economic Theory
Abstract
We show that the Pareto correspondence can be implemented in weakly undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. This resolves a question raised in Börgers (1991). The result is also extended to show that all social choice correspondences satisfying tops-inclusivity and a requirement called the seconds-property can be implemented.
First Page
229
Last Page
243
DOI
10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.010
Publication Date
3-1-2019
Recommended Citation
Mukherjee, Saptarshi; Muto, Nozomu; Ramaekers, Eve; and Sen, Arunava, "Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization" (2019). Journal Articles. 935.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/935
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