A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting

Authors

Souvik Roy, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
Ton Storcken, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Abstract

We consider domains in strategic voting problems which satisfy three properties, namely top-connectedness, pervasiveness, and richness. We prove the following two results for such a domain: (i) it admits non-dictatorial, unanimous, and strategy-proof choice functions if and only if it has an inseparable top-pair, and (ii) it admits anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof choice functions only if it does not have any top-circuit. Finally, we establish the practical relevance of our results by applying them in the context of locating a public good or a public bad, preference aggregations, policy making, etc.

First Page

46

Last Page

55

DOI

10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.06.001

Publication Date

10-1-2019

Recommended Citation

Roy, Souvik and Storcken, Ton, "A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting" (2019). Journal Articles. 679.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/679