Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
Article Type
Research Article
Publication Title
Games and Economic Behavior
Abstract
We address the balanced implementation issue for sequencing problems under incomplete information. For sequencing problems with more than two agents, we identify an important priority based sufficient class of rules that are implementable with balanced transfers. We also show that any linear sequencing rule is implementable with balanced transfers if and only if there are more than two agents. In the appendix we identify the complete class of rules that are implementable with balanced transfers when there are two agents.
First Page
342
Last Page
353
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.005
Publication Date
11-1-2019
Recommended Citation
De, Parikshit and Mitra, Manipushpak, "Balanced implementability of sequencing rules" (2019). Journal Articles. 637.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/637