A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
Article Type
Research Article
Publication Title
Games and Economic Behavior
Abstract
We characterize the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem using the axioms of outcome efficiency, budget balance, equal treatment of equals, Pareto indifference, together with a weakening of strategy-proofness, upward-invariance.
First Page
486
Last Page
490
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2015.04.001
Publication Date
11-1-2019
Recommended Citation
Chun, Youngsub; Mitra, Manipushpak; and Mutuswami, Suresh, "A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem" (2019). Journal Articles. 628.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/628
Comments
Open Access, Green