Beyond strategic reward: The shadow of trait-induced force behind evolutionary dominance

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences

Abstract

In evolutionary games, the distinction between an individual's trait and strategy is often unclear. Strategies are commonly treated as direct reflections of traits. It means the selection of a strategy is nothing but the selection of a trait. However, some morphological or physiological traits exist that do not fit in school of thought. Although in many biological systems, these traits can strongly influence interaction outcomes. So, there is a context-specific need to decouple the strategies from the notion of trait. In this study, we develop a trait-induced evolutionary game model where strategic payoffs depend on the trait-based probability of winning. Strategies are kept discrete, while traits are modelled as continuously distributed. We introduce a new probability distribution for winning likelihood to redefine the fitness function from the individual to the population level. This allows us to construct a trait-induced replicator equation and examine trait-based conditions for evolutionary success. Our analysis reveals that changes in intra-trait correlation can shift evolutionary outcomes. We also identify the critical region of mean trait difference that supports the coexistence of strategies. Beyond this region, strong trait involvement downgrades the influence of strategic reward and leads the system towards directional selection.

DOI

10.1098/rspa.2025.0535

Publication Date

11-12-2025

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