Electoral competition, electoral uncertainty and corruption: Theory and evidence from India
Article Type
Research Article
Publication Title
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Abstract
In this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption when uncertainty in elections is high, as is the case in many developing countries. Our theory shows that in such a context high levels of electoral competition may have perverse effects on corruption. We illustrate the predictions of the model with village level data on audit-detected irregularities and electoral competition from India. Our results imply that accountability can be weak in such contexts, despite high electoral competition.
DOI
10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.018
Publication Date
11-1-2024
Recommended Citation
Afridi, Farzana; Bhattacharya, Sourav; Dhillon, Amrita; and Solan, Eilon, "Electoral competition, electoral uncertainty and corruption: Theory and evidence from India" (2024). Journal Articles. 4746.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/4746