A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions
Article Type
Research Article
Publication Title
Theoretical Economics
Abstract
This paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favor of the Gul conjecture ([Barberà, 2010]).
First Page
711
Last Page
733
DOI
10.3982/TE1972
Publication Date
5-1-2016
Recommended Citation
Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava; and Zeng, Huaxia, "A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions" (2016). Journal Articles. 4047.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/4047
Comments
Open Access; Gold Open Access; Green Open Access