Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Social Choice and Welfare

Abstract

For sequencing problems, we identify the set of all mechanisms satisfying queue efficiency, strategy-proofness and budget balance. Such mechanisms are balanced VCG (or B-VCG) mechanisms up to an agent specific function that does not depend on the waiting cost of a concerned agent and for each problem these agent specific constants must add up to zero. The B-VCG mechanism is a generalization of the symmetrically balanced VCG mechanism analyzed in the queueing context. However, unlike its queueing counterpart, it fails to satisfy even the basic fairness requirement of equal treatment of equals.

First Page

35

Last Page

46

DOI

https://10.1007/s00355-020-01306-7

Publication Date

1-1-2023

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS