On the security of TrCBC

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Information Processing Letters

Abstract

TrCBC is a variant of CBC-MAC which appeared in Zhang et al. (2012) [9]. The authors claimed TrCBC to be a secure message authentication code (MAC) with some interesting properties. If TrCBC is instantiated with a block cipher with block length n, then it requires ⌈λ/n⌉ block cipher calls for authenticating a λ-bit message and requires a single key, which is the block cipher key. The authors state that TrCBC can have tag lengths of size less than n/2. We show that with high probability, an adversary can forge TrCBC with tag length n/2−1 with just three queries. The attack that we show can be applied to forge a large class of messages. The authors proved TrCBC to be a pseudorandom function (PRF). A scrutiny of the claimed PRF bound shows that for some recommended values of tag lengths, the bound turns out to be quite large. Thus, the security theorem does not imply security of TrCBC for all recommended tag lengths.

DOI

https://10.1016/j.ipl.2022.106320

Publication Date

1-1-2023

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