The Generalized Shapley Value of Cooperative Games as a Social Preference Function
Article Type
Research Article
Publication Title
Group Decision and Negotiation
Abstract
We introduce a cardinal social preference rule (CSPR) which accounts for interpersonal comparisons of alternatives in groups and satisfies several desirable properties. The proposed rule transforms voters’ individual ordinal preferences to obtain a score for each alternative given by the generalized Shapley value of cooperative games with transferable utilities. Since every CSPR induces an ordinal social preference rule (OSPR) in a natural way, the score vector, we propose in our model, induces a weak preference on the set of alternatives. The proposed CSPR is characterized by using some intuitive axioms.
First Page
277
Last Page
300
DOI
https://10.1007/s10726-022-09809-7
Publication Date
4-1-2023
Recommended Citation
Dutta, Ritu; Roy, Souvik; and Borkotokey, Surajit, "The Generalized Shapley Value of Cooperative Games as a Social Preference Function" (2023). Journal Articles. 3789.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/3789