Stable sharing

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Games and Economic Behavior

Abstract

We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit size. The preferences of agents are single-peaked and continuous on the amount of time they devote to it. Our model combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and the division problem (Sprumont (1991)). We provide an algorithm (Select-Allocate-Match) that generates a stable and Pareto efficient allocation. We show that stable allocations may fail to exist if either the single-peakedness or the continuity assumption fail.

First Page

337

Last Page

363

DOI

https://10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.009

Publication Date

9-1-2023

Comments

Open Access, Hybrid Gold

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