OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY-PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSIGNMENT RULES: A NEW CHARACTERIZATION

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

International Economic Review

Abstract

We consider assignment problems where individuals are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide a characterization of assignment rules that are Pareto efficient, nonbossy, and implementable in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms. As corollaries of our result, we obtain a characterization of OSP-implementable fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules, hierarchical exchange rules, and trading cycles rules. Troyan (International Economic Review 60 (2019), 1249–61) provides a characterization of OSP-implementable FPTTC rules when there are equal number of individuals and objects. Our result generalizes this for arbitrary values of those.

First Page

261

Last Page

290

DOI

10.1111/iere.12538

Publication Date

2-1-2022

Comments

Open Access, Green

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