Correction to “Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”

Authors

Abhigyan Bose, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
Souvik Roy, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Theoretical Economics

Abstract

Theorem 1 in Bhargava, Majumdar, and Sen (2015) provides a necessary condition for a social choice function to be locally robust ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible with respect to a belief system satisfying top-set correlation. In this paper, we provide a counterexample to that theorem and consequently provide a new necessary condition for the same in terms of sequential ordinal nondomination.

First Page

929

Last Page

942

DOI

10.3982/TE4495

Publication Date

5-1-2022

Comments

Open Access, Gold

Recommended Citation

Bose, Abhigyan and Roy, Souvik, "Correction to “Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”" (2022). Journal Articles. 3138.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/3138