Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences
Article Type
Research Article
Publication Title
Economics Letters
Abstract
We study the cake-cutting problem where agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang and Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying assumption, we characterize all Pareto optimal allocations, which have a simple structure: are peak-preserving and non-wasteful. Finally, we provide simple alternative mechanisms that Pareto dominate that of Wang–Wu and achieve envy-freeness or Pareto optimality.
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109064
Publication Date
5-1-2020
Recommended Citation
Bhardwaj, Bhavook; Kumar, Rajnish; and Ortega, Josué, "Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences" (2020). Journal Articles. 312.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/312
- Citations
- Citation Indexes: 6
- Usage
- Abstract Views: 5
- Captures
- Readers: 7
- Mentions
- References: 1
Comments
Open Access, Green