Mechanism design by observant and informed planners

Authors

Shurojit Chatterji, Singapore Management University
Arunava Sen, Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi Centre)

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Review of Economic Design

Abstract

We study the mechanism design problem where the planner can observe ex-post the first-ranked alternatives or peaks of voter preferences. We contrast this with the design problem where the planner has ex-ante information regarding the peaks of voter preferences.

First Page

665

Last Page

677

DOI

10.1007/s10058-021-00281-4

Publication Date

12-1-2022

Comments

Open Access, Green

Recommended Citation

Chatterji, Shurojit and Sen, Arunava, "Mechanism design by observant and informed planners" (2022). Journal Articles. 2882.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/2882