Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’
Article Type
Research Article
Publication Title
Constitutional Political Economy
Abstract
An ‘elite’ party caters to ‘elite’ voters, while a ‘non-elite’ party caters to ‘non-elite’ voters. Now, the ‘elite’ party wants to expand its support base to include ‘non-elite’ voters. It can do so using one of two possible strategies—it can provide them public goods or it can dole out clientelistic benefits to them. We present a probabilistic voting model to study the conditions under which the ‘elite’ party is likely to choose one or the other strategy. Our findings are supported by several historical and contemporary political experiences like that of the BJP in India, and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties in Egypt, Yemen, and Indonesia.
First Page
483
Last Page
506
DOI
10.1007/s10602-022-09361-1
Publication Date
12-1-2022
Recommended Citation
Munshi, Soumyanetra, "Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’" (2022). Journal Articles. 2881.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/2881