Balanced ranking mechanisms

Authors

Yan Long, NYU Abu Dhabi
Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi Centre)
Tridib Sharma, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Games and Economic Behavior

Abstract

In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism – a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. The mechanism converges to efficiency at an exponential rate. It allocates the object to the highest valued agent with more than 99% probability provided there are at least 14 agents. It is also ex-post individually rational. We show that our mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of satisfactory ranking mechanisms. Since achieving efficiency through a dominant strategy incentive compatible and budget-balanced mechanism is impossible in this model, our results illustrate the limits of this impossibility.

First Page

9

Last Page

39

DOI

10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.002

Publication Date

9-1-2017

Comments

Open Access, Green

Recommended Citation

Long, Yan; Mishra, Debasis; and Sharma, Tridib, "Balanced ranking mechanisms" (2017). Journal Articles. 2431.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/2431