Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
Article Type
Research Article
Publication Title
Social Choice and Welfare
Abstract
We investigate a voting model where each voter’s beliefs are positively correlated. We show that requiring a social choice function to be Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible (d’Aspremont and Peleg in Soc Choice Welf 5:261–280, 1988) with respect to all such beliefs is not equivalent to requiring it to be strategy-proof. However, if the social choice function is also required to be efficient, it must be strategy-proof and hence, dictatorial.
First Page
63
Last Page
95
DOI
10.1007/s00355-020-01304-9
Publication Date
7-1-2021
Recommended Citation
Majumdar, Dipjyoti and Sen, Arunava, "Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs" (2021). Journal Articles. 1902.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/1902
