Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs

Authors

Dipjyoti Majumdar, Concordia University
Arunava Sen, Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi Centre)

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Social Choice and Welfare

Abstract

We investigate a voting model where each voter’s beliefs are positively correlated. We show that requiring a social choice function to be Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible (d’Aspremont and Peleg in Soc Choice Welf 5:261–280, 1988) with respect to all such beliefs is not equivalent to requiring it to be strategy-proof. However, if the social choice function is also required to be efficient, it must be strategy-proof and hence, dictatorial.

First Page

63

Last Page

95

DOI

10.1007/s00355-020-01304-9

Publication Date

7-1-2021

Recommended Citation

Majumdar, Dipjyoti and Sen, Arunava, "Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs" (2021). Journal Articles. 1902.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/1902