"Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions" by Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy et al.
 

Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Games and Economic Behavior

Abstract

We identify a condition on preference domains that ensures that every locally strategy-proof and unanimous random social choice function is also strategy-proof. Furthermore every unanimous, locally strategy-proof deterministic social choice function is also group strategy-proof. The condition identified is significantly weaker than the characterization condition for local-global equivalence without unanimity in Kumar et al. (2020). The condition is not necessary for equivalence with unanimous random/deterministic social choice functions. However, we show the weaker condition of connectedness remains necessary.

First Page

299

Last Page

308

DOI

10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.009

Publication Date

11-1-2021

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS