A Spatial Game Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Identity
Using theoretical arguments and extensive simulations, in this paper we conclude that in a spatial evolutionary Hawk–Dove game with uncorrelated asymmetry and informational asymmetry, the evolutionarily stable strategy against multiple mutations (ESSMM) largely coincides with the fairness equilibria of Hawk–Dove game. The shift from one fairness equilibrium to another bases itself on risk dominance criterion. Moreover, we notice that in spatial games the ESSMM turns out to be pure strategy except in the case where every player has prior information about the identity of the other player. Our results has interesting implications for designing fair behaviour inducing mechanisms.
Ghatak, Anirban; Mukherjee, Diganta; and Mallikarjuna Rao, K. S., "A Spatial Game Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Identity" (2018). Journal Articles. 1309.