A Spatial Game Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Identity

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Computational Economics

Abstract

Using theoretical arguments and extensive simulations, in this paper we conclude that in a spatial evolutionary Hawk–Dove game with uncorrelated asymmetry and informational asymmetry, the evolutionarily stable strategy against multiple mutations (ESSMM) largely coincides with the fairness equilibria of Hawk–Dove game. The shift from one fairness equilibrium to another bases itself on risk dominance criterion. Moreover, we notice that in spatial games the ESSMM turns out to be pure strategy except in the case where every player has prior information about the identity of the other player. Our results has interesting implications for designing fair behaviour inducing mechanisms.

First Page

493

Last Page

519

DOI

10.1007/s10614-017-9684-6

Publication Date

8-1-2018

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