Date of Submission


Date of Award


Institute Name (Publisher)

Indian Statistical Institute

Document Type

Doctoral Thesis

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

Subject Name

Quantitative Economics


Economics and Planning Unit (EPU-Delhi)


Sen, Arunava (EPU-Delhi; ISI)

Abstract (Summary of the Work)

This thesis comprises four essays on social choice theory. The first three essays/chapters consider models where voters follow “non-standard” rules for decision making. The last chapter considers the binary social choice model and analyzes the consequences of a new axiom. The first chapter introduces a new axiom for manipulability when voters incur a cost if they misreport their true preference ordering. The second chapter considers the random voting model with strategic voters where standard stochastic dominance strategy-proofness is replaced by strategy-proofness under two lexicographic criteria. The third chapter also considers the random voting model but from a non-strategic perspective. It introduces a new “robustness to small mistakes” by voters. The last chapter provides a characterization of the status quo rule.


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Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.


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