Date of Submission

7-22-2020

Date of Award

7-22-2021

Institute Name (Publisher)

Indian Statistical Institute

Document Type

Doctoral Thesis

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

Subject Name

Quantitative Economics

Department

Economics and Planning Unit (EPU-Delhi)

Supervisor

Sen, Arunava (EPU-Delhi; ISI)

Abstract (Summary of the Work)

This thesis comprises four essays on social choice theory. The first three essays/chapters consider models where voters follow “non-standard” rules for decision making. The last chapter considers the binary social choice model and analyzes the consequences of a new axiom. The first chapter introduces a new axiom for manipulability when voters incur a cost if they misreport their true preference ordering. The second chapter considers the random voting model with strategic voters where standard stochastic dominance strategy-proofness is replaced by strategy-proofness under two lexicographic criteria. The third chapter also considers the random voting model but from a non-strategic perspective. It introduces a new “robustness to small mistakes” by voters. The last chapter provides a characterization of the status quo rule.

Comments

ProQuest Collection ID: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqm&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:28843888

Control Number

ISILib-TH501

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

DOI

http://dspace.isical.ac.in:8080/jspui/handle/10263/2146

Download

Included in

Mathematics Commons

Share

COinS