Date of Submission

1-22-2001

Date of Award

1-22-2002

Institute Name (Publisher)

Indian Statistical Institute

Document Type

Doctoral Thesis

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

Subject Name

Quantitative Economics

Department

Economics and Planning Unit (EPU-Delhi)

Supervisor

Dutta, Bhaskar (EPU-Delhi; ISI)

Abstract (Summary of the Work)

This dissertation explores some issues concerning the behaviour of coalitions of individuals in a game theoretic set-up and also studies one aspect of a society facing collective action of the masses. The common feature of the issues explored in the dissertation is that it investigates the properties of stable social states. Chapter 2 introduces a notion of a social state that is unlikely to be displaced by any coalition of agents endowed with a certain notion of rationality and a certain degree of farsightedness and explores the properties of such states. Chapter 3 is also concerned with coalitionally stable social states with a different social set-up and social norm. Chapter 4 is an analysis of a society where the prevailing social state is threatened with collective action by the masses.1.1 Coalitional Stability and CredibilityThe theme of Chapter 2 entitled Coalitional Stability with a Credibility Constraint is to study the properties of stable social states when the coali- tions are restricted to deviate credibly . Later we shall explain the precise meaning in which we use the term credible deviations.Many social systems are inherently unstable to coalitional deviations whatever be the status quo social state. a coalition of agents has an incentive to enforce a different social state from it. The well-known example of ;paradox of voting; is a clear illustration of that. Suppose there are three persons: 1, 2 and 3 and three social states: a, b and c. By x>iy we mean that person i strictly prefers state z to state y. Suppose the persons order the social states in the following manner: b>1a>1c, c>2b>2a, a>3c>3b. Suppose a majority coalition can enforce one state from another. Note that if a is the status quo social state, then 1 and 2 can enforce b from it; if b is the status quo social state, then 2 and 3 can enforce c from it and if c is the status quo social state, then 1 and 3 can enforce a from it. The key feature of this example is that for every social state there is a majority coalition that prefers a different social state. This somewhat disturbing aspect of a society has generated a substantial body of literature proposing different rules that identify outcomes which are immune to coalitional deviations. Of course, the assumptions on the behaviour of agents vary from one rule to another.The society under consideration in this essay is represented by a proper simple game, a subclass of simple games.

Comments

ProQuest Collection ID: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqm&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:28842882

Control Number

ISILib-TH116

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

DOI

http://dspace.isical.ac.in:8080/jspui/handle/10263/2146

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