Failure tolerant rational secret sharing
Document Type
Conference Article
Publication Title
Proceedings - International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications, AINA
Abstract
In existing rational secret sharing protocols, players follow a strategy that causes them to abort the protocol as soon as even a single player does not send its share. Such secret reconstruction protocols run over several rounds and it may be reasonable for a party to fail or not send its share by mistake sometimes. In practical situations, where failures (such as network failure, power outage, low battery power for mobile devices etc.) are common, this would lead to diminished chances of reconstructing the secret due to the unforgiving nature of the strategy followed. In this work, we introduce a forgiving strategy based on ostracism for one round. Here, a player that defects, i.e., does not send a share, is punished for a single round after its defection and is allowed to rejoin the game in the subsequent round. In this sense, we propose a failure-tolerant rational secret sharing protocol in the simultaneous channel model. Of course, we tolerate only occasional failures, mistakes and even intentional silence within a reasonable limit. Our protocol is suitable for a scenario where the reconstruction of the secret is absolutely necessary and failures are common.
First Page
925
Last Page
932
DOI
10.1109/AINA.2016.65
Publication Date
5-19-2016
Recommended Citation
De, Sourya Joyee and Ruj, Sushmita, "Failure tolerant rational secret sharing" (2016). Conference Articles. 708.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/conf-articles/708
