What calibrating variable-value population ethics suggests

Authors

Dean Spears, The University of Texas at Austin
H. Orri Stefánsson, Institute for Futures Studies

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Economics and Philosophy

Abstract

Variable-Value axiologies avoid Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion while satisfying some weak instances of the Mere Addition principle. We apply calibration methods to two leading members of the family of Variable-Value views conditional upon: first, a very weak instance of Mere Addition and, second, some plausible empirical assumptions about the size and welfare of the intertemporal world population. We find that such facts calibrate these two Variable-Value views to be nearly totalist, and therefore imply conclusions that should seem repugnant to anyone who opposes Total Utilitarianism only due to the Repugnant Conclusion.

First Page

673

Last Page

684

DOI

10.1017/S0266267124000026

Publication Date

11-1-2024

Comments

Open Access; Green Open Access; Hybrid Gold Open Access

Recommended Citation

Spears, Dean and Stefánsson, H. Orri, "What calibrating variable-value population ethics suggests" (2024). Journal Articles. 5192.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/5192