Symmetric reduced-form voting

Authors

Xu Lang, Shandong University
Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi Centre)

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Theoretical Economics

Abstract

We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probability can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti-majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a symmetric monotone (strategy-proof) voting rule and by a symmetric unanimous voting rule. We apply our results to show that an ex ante Rawlsian rule is a convex combination of a pair of qualified majority rules.

First Page

605

Last Page

634

DOI

10.3982/TE5400

Publication Date

5-1-2024

Comments

Open Access; Gold Open Access; Green Open Access

Recommended Citation

Lang, Xu and Mishra, Debasis, "Symmetric reduced-form voting" (2024). Journal Articles. 5124.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/5124