Selling two complementary goods
Article Type
Research Article
Publication Title
International Journal of Game Theory
Abstract
A seller is selling a pair of divisible complementary goods to an agent. The agent consumes the goods only in a specific ratio and freely disposes of excess in either good. The value of the bundle and the ratio are the agent’s private information. In this two-dimensional type space model, we characterize the incentive constraints and show that the optimal (expected revenue-maximizing) mechanism is a ratio-dependent posted price or a posted price mechanism for a class of distributions. We also show that the optimal mechanism is a posted price mechanism when the value and the ratio are independently distributed.
First Page
423
Last Page
447
DOI
10.1007/s00182-023-00879-8
Publication Date
6-1-2024
Recommended Citation
Malik, Komal and Paramahamsa, Kolagani, "Selling two complementary goods" (2024). Journal Articles. 5072.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/5072