Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: An equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
Article Type
Research Article
Publication Title
Journal of Economic Theory
Abstract
We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buyer with decreasing marginal values. We derive three new results for the identical-objects model: (i) a new condition for revenue monotonicity of stochastic mechanisms, (ii) a sufficient condition on priors, such that prices in optimal deterministic mechanism are not increasing, and (iii) a simplification of incentive constraints for deterministic mechanisms. We use the equivalence to establish corresponding results in the heterogeneous-objects model.
DOI
10.1016/j.jet.2024.105923
Publication Date
12-1-2024
Recommended Citation
Bikhchandani, Sushil and Mishra, Debasis, "Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: An equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models" (2024). Journal Articles. 5028.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/5028
Comments
Open Access; Green Open Access