PERTURBED BAYESIAN BEST RESPONSE DYNAMIC IN CONTINUUM GAMES

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization

Abstract

The notion of perturbed Bayesian best response dynamic for continuum strategy Bayesian population games is introduced. Fundamental properties of the dynamic such as existence of perturbed equilibrium, convergence of the perturbed equilibrium to the Bayesian equilibrium of the underlying game, as well as existence, uniqueness, and continuity of solutions from arbitrary initial conditions is established. As applications to the theory, convergence of solutions to the perturbed equilibria is shown to hold for two classes of games, namely, Bayesian potential games and Bayesian negative semidefinite games.

First Page

3091

Last Page

3120

DOI

10.1137/23M1591931

Publication Date

1-1-2024

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