On Completely Mixed Games

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

Abstract

A matrix game is considered completely mixed if all the optimal pairs of strategies in the game are completely mixed. In this paper, we establish that a matrix game A, with a value of zero, is completely mixed if and only if the value of the game associated with A+Di is positive for all i, where Di represents a diagonal matrix where ith diagonal entry is 1 and else 0. Additionally, we address Kaplansky’s question from 1945 regarding whether an odd-ordered symmetric game can be completely mixed, and provide characterizations for odd-ordered skew-symmetric matrices to be completely mixed. Moreover, we demonstrate that if A is an almost skew-symmetric matrix and the game associated with A has value positive, then A+Di∈Q for all i, where Di is a diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal entry is 1 and else 0. Skew-symmetric matrices and almost skew-symmetric matrices with value positive fall under the class of P0 and Q0, making them amenable to processing through Lemke’s algorithm.

First Page

313

Last Page

322

DOI

10.1007/s10957-024-02395-5

Publication Date

4-1-2024

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