How do voters respond to welfare vis-à-vis public good programs? Theory and evidence of political clientelism

Authors

Pranab Bardhan, University of California, Berkeley
Sandip Mitra, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
Dilip Mookherjee, College of Arts & Sciences
Anusha Nath, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Quantitative Economics

Abstract

Using rural household survey data from West Bengal, we find that voters respond positively to excludable government welfare benefits but not to local public good programs, while reporting having benefited from both. Consistent with these voting patterns, shocks to electoral competition induced by exogenous redistricting of villages resulted in upper-tier governments manipulating allocations across local governments only for excludable benefit programs. Using a hierarchical budgeting model, we argue these results provide credible evidence of the presence of clientelism rather than programmatic politics.

First Page

655

Last Page

697

DOI

10.3982/QE2315

Publication Date

7-1-2024

Comments

Open Access; Gold Open Access

Recommended Citation

Bardhan, Pranab; Mitra, Sandip; Mookherjee, Dilip; and Nath, Anusha, "How do voters respond to welfare vis-à-vis public good programs? Theory and evidence of political clientelism" (2024). Journal Articles. 4829.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/4829