Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms

Authors

Lars Ehlers, University of Montreal
Dipjyoti Majumdar, Concordia University
Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi Centre)
Arunava Sen, Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi Centre)

Article Type

Research Article

Publication Title

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Abstract

In models without transfers, we show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, can only take ordinal, but not cardinal information into account. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.

First Page

31

Last Page

41

DOI

10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.004

Publication Date

5-1-2020

Recommended Citation

Ehlers, Lars; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Mishra, Debasis; and Sen, Arunava, "Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms" (2020). Journal Articles. 313.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/313