The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences
Article Type
Research Article
Publication Title
International Game Theory Review
Abstract
This paper considers the Gale-Shapley model with interdependent preferences. Women's preferences over men are common knowledge but whether or not a man is acceptable depends on the preferences of men which are private information. It is shown that no ex-post incentive-compatible and ex-post stable matching rules exist. A characterization of ex-post incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational and ex-post nonbossy matching rules in terms of modified priority rules is provided.
DOI
10.1142/S0219198920400058
Publication Date
6-1-2020
Recommended Citation
Pourpouneh, Mohsen; Ramezanian, Rasoul; and Sen, Arunava, "The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences" (2020). Journal Articles. 266.
https://digitalcommons.isical.ac.in/journal-articles/266