Date of Submission


Date of Award


Institute Name (Publisher)

Indian Statistical Institute

Document Type

Doctoral Thesis

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

Subject Name

Computer Science


Theoretical Statistics and Mathematics Unit (TSMU-Kolkata)


Mookherjee, Dillip

Abstract (Summary of the Work)

This thesis contains four essays which broadly come under the area of Dynamic Games. All the essays involve developments or applications of non-cooperative equilibrium concepts to games played over infinite horizons. The two essays in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 involve the concept of renegotiation proof equilibriain repeated games. The essay in Chapter 4 discusses how a social norm of slow building of trust in bilateral relationships can be understood as a social equi- librium even in the absence of asymmetric information problems. Chapter 5, which represents joint work with Prabal Raychaudhuri, applies non-cooperative bargaining theory to a context where the management of a firm has to bargain with the union over wages and employment levels simultaneously, in the presence of minimum wage regulation.The issues addressed in Chapter 2, titled Existence of Internally Renego- tiation Proof Sets in Infinitely Repeated Gamesare as follows. The notion of Renegotiation Proof sets in infinitely repeated games involves internal as well as external consistency. Debraj Ray (1994) has recently argued that in infinitely repeated games with discounting, Weakly Renegotiation Proof sets (WRP sets)as defined by farrell and maskin (1989),do not satisfy a natural internal consistency property.Ray defines an internal consistancy property.


ProQuest Collection ID:

Control Number


Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.


Included in

Mathematics Commons